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Judgments, Preferences, and Compromise

Lookup NU author(s): Professor Ian O'FlynnORCiD

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This is the authors' accepted manuscript of an article that has been published in its final definitive form by Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2023.

For re-use rights please refer to the publisher's terms and conditions.

Abstract

Recent work on compromise has focused principally on issues raised by compromising in cases of moral disagreement. We shift away from issues of that sort and examine the merits of compromise as a mechanism for resolving conflicts of non-moral judgment and non-moral preference. We show that, while the case for compromise applies with ease to conflicts of preference, it applies with no similar ease to conflicts of judgment. More particularly, we argue that, while compromising on conflicts of non-moral judgment may be justified instrumentally, it cannot be justified non-instrumentally. We make that case by considering and dismissing three putative non-instrumental reasons for compromising among judgments: epistemic enhancement, fairness and respect. We also consider whether, as Simon May has argued, the same reasoning applies to the case for compromising among moral judgments and why it may not.

Publication metadata

Author(s): Jones P, O'Flynn I

Publication type: Article

Publication status: Published

Journal: Journal of Social Philosophy

Year: 2023

Volume: 54

Issue: 1

Pages: 77-93

Print publication date: 01/04/2023

Online publication date: 04/01/2022

Acceptance date: 13/10/2021

Date deposited: 04/01/2022

ISSN (print): 0047-2786

ISSN (electronic): 1467-9833

Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12454

DOI: 10.1111/josp.12454

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