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The obsolescing bargain model and oil: The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company 1933-1951

Lookup NU author(s): Dr Neveen AbdelrehimORCiD

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This is the authors' accepted manuscript of an article that has been published in its final definitive form by Taylor and Francis, 2017.

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Abstract

We employ archival evidence to investigate events culminating in the nationalisation of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) in 1951, which followed disagreements over profit allocations arising from a previously negotiated concession. The case study expands the traditional obsolescing bargain model (OBM) by accommodating the use and impact of accounting information in negotiation contexts. The analysis reveals that managerial control and the deployment of accounting information by the AIOC temporarily strengthened its bargaining power vis-à-vis the Iranian government leading up to the nationalisation crisis, demonstrating the potential importance of these new dimensions in wider contexts.

Publication metadata

Author(s): Abdelrehim N, Toms S

Publication type: Article

Publication status: Published

Journal: Business History

Year: 2017

Volume: 59

Issue: 4

Pages: 554-571

Online publication date: 23/09/2016

Acceptance date: 14/09/2016

Date deposited: 05/12/2017

ISSN (print): 0007-6791

ISSN (electronic): 1743-7938

Publisher: Taylor and Francis

URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/00076791.2016.1232397

DOI: 10.1080/00076791.2016.1232397

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